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Aquinas (Past Masters Series), by Anthony Kenny. New York: Hill and Wang, 
1980. Pp. viii + 86. Paper $3.95. 
Reviewed by NORMAN KRETZMANN, Cornell University. 
Anyone who accepts an invitation to write a book of eighty small pages on 
an author as voluminous and systematic as Aquinas is committed to doing some-
thing drastic: a broad surveyor detailed discussions of only a few selected topics. 
Kenny's way of handling this difficult assignment involves a generally successful 
combination of those drastic measures. "The book is divided into three chapters. 
The first is an account of St Thomas's life and works and an assessment of his 
significance for contemporary philosophy. The second is a sketch of the major 
concepts of Aquinas's metaphysical system: it includes a discussion ofthe doctrine 
of Being, which is one of the most famous, but also the most overrated, elements 
in his philosophy. The third chapter is devoted to Aquinas's philosophy of mind, 
which is less well known but far more rewarding to study"(Preface). 
Kenny is almost apologetic about his first chapter, describing it as "very 
heavily dependent" on Weisheipl's Friar Thomas d'Aquino (Bibliographical 
Note) and as "of necessity extremely sketchy and impressionistic" (p.30). But 
the subjective touches that make this evaluative survey impressionistic are also 
what make it particularly insightful and enjoyable. Everyone who has studied 
Aquinas will find something or other to question or quarrel with in Chapter One, 
but for ordinary secular students of philosophy, I don't believe there is a better 
brief introduction (31 pp.) to Aquinas's life and works, to his philosophical 
s<:tting and his philosophical significance. Its admitted sketchiness does lead to 
a few pedagogical lapses, as when Kenny reports that "In Aquinas's technical 
terminology, when we talk of God's goodness, or his wisdom, or his love, we 
are using words not univocally, or equivocally, but analogically," leaving all 
those technical terms unexplained (p.9). A dictionary will do for the first two 
but is likely to be misleading regarding the crucial term 'analogically.' Fortu-
nately, Kenny's own clear philosophical style survives its encounter with 
Aquinas's scholastic terminology. He not only avoids the jargon characteristic 
of too many writers on Aquinas but also introduces some happy innovations, 
such as 'idea' for species intelligibilis (p.69) and 'receptive intellect' for intel-
lectus possibilis (inadvertently also called 'potential intellect' at one point) (p. 18). 
Although Aquinas's theology receives a fair amount of attention in the initial 
survey chapter, it is not among the topics Kenny takes up in the more detailed 
discussions of Chapters Two and Three (as can be seen from his summary, 
quoted above). Readers who know very little about Aquinas-the readers for 
whom a volume on him in the Past Masters series appears to be designed-are 
likely to be disappointed to find so little on his work in the field he is most 
clearly associated with, and more than one reviewer has complained of this 
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feature of the book, remarking, for instance, that "it treats Aquinas's theology 
as if it were merely an incidental shell from which a valuable kernel of philosoph-
ical erudition can be extracted" (David Caute, New Statesman 4 April 1980). It 
is unfair to suggest in this way that Kenny's attitude towards Aquinas's theology 
is dismissive, however; he pretty clearly has other reasons for giving theology 
short shrift here. 
He might be taken to be offering such a reason in the opening sentence of his 
Preface: "This is a book about Thomas Aquinas as a philosopher: it is written 
for readers who may not necessarily share his theological interests and beliefs." 
But that, I think, is not his reason. Omitting the theology in order to accommodate 
the non-Christian reader of the Aquinas volume in this series would be as inap-
propriate as omitting the social and economic theory from the volume on Marx 
"for readers who may not necessarily share his ... interests and beliefs." 
Kenny's real reasons for his de-emphasis of theology as well as for his choice 
and his treatment of the philosophical topics taken up in Chapters Two and Three 
are most nearly explicit, I think, in this passage: "Aquinas is little read nowadays 
by professional philosophers: he has received much less attention in philosophy 
departments, whether in the continental tradition or in the Anglo-American one, 
than lesser thinkers such as Berkeley or Hegel. He has, of course, been extensively 
studied in theological colleges and in the philosophy courses of ecclesiastical 
institutions; but ecclesiastical endorsement has itself damaged Aquinas's reputa-
tion with secular philosophers, who have tended to discount him as simply a 
propagandist for Catholicism. Moreover, the official respect accorded to Aquinas 
by the Church has meant that his opinions and arguments have frequently been 
presented in crude ways by admirers who failed to appreciate his philosophical 
sophistication. But since the Second Vatican Council Aquinas seems to have 
lost something of the pre-eminent favour he enjoyed in ecclesiastical circles, 
and to have been superseded, in the reading-lists of ordinands, by fashionable 
authors judged more relevant to the contemporary scene. This wind of ecclesias-
tical change may blow no harm to his reputation in secular circles" (pp. 27-28). 
The truth is that, with a small but growing number of other philosophers outside 
Catholicism, Kenny is on an expedition to salvage Aquinas; and it is astonishing 
to watch the rich prize being abandoned by some of its crew without a fight, as 
in these concluding sentences by a Catholic reviewer: "No Catholic intellectual 
who was not an idiot would disparage Aquinas, or for that matter under-estimate 
the Master of Balliol's interpretation of him. But today the intellectual case for 
Catholicism and indeed for Christianity lies elsewhere" (Frank Longford, Books 
and Bookmen 25, April 1980). In this book Kenny himself is not concerned with 
the intellectual case for Christianity, but philosophers who do have that concern 
may be glad to retrieve and give new use to what strikes some of us as still the 
richest single source for rational theology. 
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Kenny's immediate concern is rather to draw out some of Aquinas's "philosoph-
ical insights which entitle him to be considered as one of the world's great 
philosophers" (Preface); and to do that most effectively against the background 
sketched in the long passage quoted above, he understandably focuses on topics 
that have no obvious connection with theology. (He has special warrant for 
restricting a short, general book in this drastic way just because several respectable 
treatments of Aquinas as a philosopher and a theologian are available-e.g., 
Gilson's and Copleston's.) His third chapter, on Aquinas's philosophy of mind, 
serves his ostensible purpose admirably. In it he argues that "the writings of 
Aquinas on the topics nowadays treated by philosophers of mind remain of value" 
(p. 61), presenting a philosophically stimulating and attractive account that is 
laudatory without being uncritical. Some parts of the theory Kenny finds "obscure 
in detail and probably confused" or "in some respects naive and unsatisfactory" 
(pp. 75 & 78); on the other hand, he picks out "Aquinas's doctrine of the 
intentional existence of foOlls" as "one of the most interesting contributions ever 
made to the philosophical problem of the nature of thought" (p. 80). 
Kenny's second chapter, on Aquinas's metaphysics, is not so markedly critical 
as his summary of it (quoted above) or his introduction to it (p. 32) suggest. In 
fact most of it consists of an admirably clear, often favorable, exposition of 
notions basic to the Aristotelian-Thomistic system, and the really critical material 
is concentrated in a discussion of Aquinas's distinction between essence and 
existence (pp. 53-60). Nevertheless, Kenny himself seems to stress the negative 
aspect of this chapter, the first of his two detailed discussions, in a way that 
sharpens the point of one reviewer's question: "but why give the reader, who's 
presumably new to all this, such a hard time by dismantling the complex system 
almost as soon as it's been unpacked and assembled?" (Anon., Kirkus Reviews 
1980, p. 421). The situation is not nearly so bad as the question suggests, but 
the salvage effort really might have been better served by a different discussion 
in depth of a part of Aquinas's philosophy Kenny admires more than his treatment 
of essence and existence-his analysis of human action, for instance, or his 
moral philosophy. 
Perhaps Kenny emphasizes his criticism of Aquinas's doctrine of being in 
order to further the negative side of the purpose discernible in the long passage 
I quoted above. For he seems to have been concerned not only to enhance 
Aquinas's reputation as a philosopher but also to extricate him further from 
"ecclesiastical circles," and it is within those circles that Aquinas's account of 
essence and existence has sometimes seemed to be his "most celebrated doctrine 
concerning esse" (p. 53). I agree with Kenny that the importance of this doctrine 
has been overemphasized (although I think his criticism of it might have been 
carried out more effectively and less distractingly in a different setting); he is 
probably not ready to agree with me that Aquinas's account of the relationship 
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between being and goodness deserves to be his most celebrated doctrine con-
cerning esse. 
My misgivings about this little book are far outweighed by my admiration of 
it. It is what I will recommend to any non-specialist colleague or student who 
wants a good, brief, philosophical introduction to Aquinas. 
The Effectiveness of Causes, by Dorothy Emmett. Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1985. pp. x + 136. Cloth $34.50; paper $14.95. 
Reviewed by RICHARD E. CREEL, Ithaca College. 
Emmett's Causes is an important contribution to analytic and speculative 
metaphysics, and though most of her references are to analytic philosophers, 
she discusses several idealist philosophers and acknowledges a large debt to the 
middle works of A.N. Whitehead. 
The first thrust of Causes is to show that the Humean analysis of causation, 
i.e., 'event-causation,' is unsatisfactory. According to event-causation the basic 
constituents of reality are events that occur and perish instantaneously. Con-
sequently, the appearance of change in an enduring object and of efficient cau-
sation between objects are illusions. 
Emmett argues that memory makes it impossible for us to believe this interpre-
tation of causation. "On the model of causation as a sequence of events, a present 
state succeeds a past state, and that is all there is to be said. But memory suggests 
there is a great deal more to be said. What has happened in the past has had 
real effects in making us what we are ... " [93]. "We cannot doubt that our 
present life is shaped by past experiences" [91]. "Our primitive experience is of 
the derivation of what is going on in the present from what was going on in the 
immediate past" [88]. 
The way out of the Zeno-universe of event -causation is to start with the position 
that the basic constituents of reality are things, not events. Events are secondary 
to things, occurring because the actions of things upon one another cause trans-
actions, impacts, operations that result in change of one sort or another, including 
the persistence of an object from one moment to the next. 
A cause is "something on which something happening to something else 
depends" [87]. Emmett distinguishes two types of cause. In transeunt causation 
there is "a product apart from the activity of producing," as when one thing acts 
upon another. In immanent causation "the product is not separable from the 
activity producing it," as in a dance or a recollection. Transeunt causation depends 
upon immanent causation because the transeunt impact of one individual on 
another presupposes the persistence of each while the causal transaction takes 
